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Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver; Kawamura, Kohei - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2007

We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel’s [4] (noiseless) communication game as a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability e ? (0, 1) that the received message is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750745

Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication

Hertel, Johanna; Smith, John - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, unlike the classic cheap talk setup, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543017

Noisy talk

Board, Oliver J.; Blume, Andreas; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812758

Paradox of Credibility

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) - 2008

In an information transmission situation, a senders concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible … power to control the detected. In this case, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility … its credibility could result in less truthful signals from the sender and worse payoffs to the receiver. This is the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009365389

Paradox of Credibility

Jung, Hanjoon Michael - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible …, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility, which stays true even when the sender and the … receiver have contradictory preferences. Therefore, the sender's concern for its credibility could result in less truthful …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789900

Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

Okada, Akira - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 1165-1190

In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572398

Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences

Duffy, John; Munoz-Garcia, Felix - Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh - 2012

This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner's dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players' concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding "inequity aversion." In this environment,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878527

Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core

Okada, Akira - Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University - 2009

We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008495521

Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core

Okada, Akira - Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992471

Ordinal Cheap Talk

Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick - Economics Department, Claremont McKenna College - 2003

Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For instance, can a professor credibly rank different students for a prospective employer even if she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly rank different stocks even if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795951