This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a serious drawback in that, even though incentive compatible ex ante, they violate ex post rationality. For such contracts to be feasible, banks should be able to extract more under failure than...

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in <link rid="b4">Ghatak (2000)</link> violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability...

The paper builds a two-sector general-equilibrium model, with one homogeneous and one differentiated good. The differentiated good has increasing returns to scale. Preferences are nonhomothetic with a hierarchy of wants. Income distribution is determined by the ownership of inputs and endogenous...

This paper investigates the incidence of poverty in Indian towns and cities of various sizes of population. It also tests the hypothesis that larger towns and cities, because of their size, are capable of supporting more complex economic activities, improving labor productivity, and hence...

Traditional research in the context of product market entry has explored the strategic reactions of incumbent firms when threatened by the possibility of entry, and have identified industry-specific factors that affect entry rates. However, following <link rid="b12">de Soto (1989</link>), there has been increasing...