This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

If a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the...

In this paper, we deal with a multicriteria competitive Markov decision process. In the decision process there are two decision makers with a competitive behaviour, so they are usually called players. Their rewards are coupled because depend on the actions chosen by both players in each state of...

In this paper, we deal with a multicriteria competitive Markov decision process. In the decision process there are two decision makers with a competitive behaviour, so they are usually called players. Their rewards are coupled because depend on the actions chosen by both players in each state of...

In this paper, we deal with a multicriteria competitive Markov decision process. In the decision process there are two decision makers with a competitive behaviour, so they are usually called players. Their rewards are coupled because depend on the actions chosen by both players in each state of...

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to-check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria....

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are...

In this paper we investigate the existence of Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games. In particular we show that every vector-valued extensive form game with perfect information has at least one subgame perfect Pareto equilibrium in pure strategies. If one tries to prove this...