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, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the … replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the …
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The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759303
The study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs (Methods Oper. Res. 46:395–406, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1983</CitationRef>) and Driessen (OR Spectrum 7:19–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>). However, until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of...</citationref></citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010995384
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950100
One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755680
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two- person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure com- posed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005148381
We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2000</CitationRef>) in a way that parallels...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154913
In the paper we present an application of the generalized Owen value, defined in our former work, for partition function form games. We apply this value to simple games, modeling multicandidate or multioptional voting. We also present an example of application of this concept to measuring the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010540