second-price sealed bid auction that lets the insider win only if his bid is above a hurdle price …

favor the weak buyer. However, we show that the seller can do one better by augmenting the first-price auction by a pre-auction … ordinary first-price auction. The result is driven by the fact that the unmodified first-price auction is too favorable to the … weak buyer, and that the pre-auction offer allows some correction of this to the benefit of the seller. Secondly, we show …

auction bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that bidders … participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the … auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction efficiency. In …

auction formats that make bidding difficult and risky in different ways. We find that measures of `difficulty' provide a …

optimal auction, the first price auction and the second price auction. …

reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and …