auction bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that bidders … participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the … auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction efficiency. In …

auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly …

optimal auction, the first price auction and the second price auction. …

auction formats that make bidding difficult and risky in different ways. We find that measures of `difficulty' provide a …

former favor the weak buyer. However, we show that the seller can do one better by augmenting the first-price auction by a … pre-auction offer made exclusively to the strong buyer. Should the strong buyer reject the offer, the object is simply … sold in an ordinary first-price auction. The result is driven by the fact that the unmodified first-price auction is too …

A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When … the prize has a common-value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids … the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic e¤ect on the seller.s revenue. …

second-price sealed bid auction that lets the insider win only if his bid is above a hurdle price …

reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and …