We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential...

Cet article traite de l'effet des mécanismes de réponse de la demande sur l'efficacité des marchés de gros d'électricité. Dans le cadre des réformes de libéralisation des marchés de l'énergie, l'attention a initialement porté sur le seul coté offre du marché, supposant implicitement...

This paper experimentally investigates whether money illusion generates substantial nominal inertia. Building on the design of Fehr and Tyran (2001), we find no evidence that agents choose high nominal payoffs over high real payoffs. However, participants do select prices associated with high...

Our experiments refine and extend the work of Fehr and Tyran (2001), who suggest that money illusion can contribute significantly to nominal inertia in strategically complementary environments. By controlling for strategic uncertainty, visual focal points and cognitive load we find that...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level : (i)...

Cet article présente les résultats de recherches en économie expérimentale visant à mesurer les propensions à payer d'un échantillon de consommateurs français pour des yaourts fonctionnels. Nous mesurons l'impact de l'information concernant les caractéristiques fonctionnelles des...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the...

We examine investment incentives and market power in an experimental market. We characterize market power as the strategic interdependence of subjects' investment decisions and output decisions. The market is designed so that investment and output decisions can be jointly characterized as...

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very...