express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle must generate both of these paradoxes. Copyright …

states of the world. We characterize the optimal anonymous and deterministic voting rule and provide a homogeneity assumption … on preferences and beliefs under which sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium for this rule. We also provide a necessary … and sufficient condition for sincere voting to be an equilibrium under any deterministic majoritarian voting rule. We show …

different values to the two types of mistake that may occur. Most voting rules have a plethora of uninformative equilibria, and … informative voting may be incompatible with equilibrium. We analyze an anonymous randomized majority rule that has a unique … under certain perturbations of the behavioral assumptions: (i) a slight preference for voting according to one's conviction …

candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of …

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts signi…cant turnout rates even when the electorate is … vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare …

What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism? Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these … utilitarianism or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is best approached by a voting system converging to … questions for the case of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We show that plurality …

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is … vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare …

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority … strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain …