equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The â …

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response … set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest …). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given. …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … equilibrium under a wide class of learning processes. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth … strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but in one game the NE is stable …

boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This …