By a player splitting we mean a mechanism that distributes the information sets of a player among so-called agents. A player splitting is called independent if each path in the game tree contains at most one agent of every player. Following Mertens (1989), a solution is said to have the player...

This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed entirely in terms of the choice partition without any reference to any information sets. When information sets are taken into account it is decomposable into an...

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible...

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when the empirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behavior strategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization of empirical...

The standard model of an extensive form game rules out an important phenomenon in situations of strategic interaction: deception. Using examples from the world of ancient Greece and from modern-day Wall Street, we show how the model can be generalized to incorporate this phenomenon. Deception...

We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents` strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption...