It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core … core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game … and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 …

theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex … game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete separation theorem (Frank, 1982). We introduce a definition of …

allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …

service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that … shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost … game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if …

. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative … the nonemptiness of the core of project games. …

jobs. Using nonstandard techniques we prove that each family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a … particular marginal vector belongs to the core. Finally, we specifically analyze the case in which the initial order is family …

game is associated and the proportional distribution arises as a natural core allocation. We describe a necessary and … sufficient condition for which the core of the game shrinks to the proportional distribution. Furthermore, we characterize … axiomatically the proportional distribution by means of three properties: core-selection, core-invariance and resource monotonicity …

and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included …