This paper analyses individual information acquisition in an ultimatum game with a-priori unknown outside options. We find that while individual play seems to accord reasonably well with the distribution of empirical behavior, contestants seem to grossly overweigh the value of information. While...

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and responder can share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a reward distribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). The games only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations will typically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionary model, beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive behavior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategic substitutes and complements and...

We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...

In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n = 2) state-speciïfic assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The...

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the implications of coalition formation and the entry of some Central and Eastern European countries on the voting power of the member states. The analysis is based on the...

In this paper we offer a new approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity, the so-called factor-based strategies. In our model, the strategy of a player in the multi-stage game does not directly map the set of histories to the set of her actions. Instead, the player's perception of is...

Research Joint Ventures and subsidies are important R&D policy instruments. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there are appropriability problems is one such variable that is private information to the firms...

This paper analyses the behaviour and motivation of fund managers in foreign exchange markets reflected in questionnaire evidence. We find that fund managers and FX dealers differ significantly. Fund managers rely more on fundamentals, basically due to their longer forecasting horizons, and...