Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A <Subscript>1</Subscript>,A <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,A <Subscript> n </Subscript>, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a <Subscript>1</Subscript>,a <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,a <Subscript> n </Subscript>)...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

We consider a duopoly market in which two retailers with different reputation compete in prices and one of the retailers is considering selling through a new channel. Consumers are reputation sensitive and averse to the new channel. In addition, the reputation sensitivity and new channel...

Takeover and acquisition of corporations is awell-researched area and has been becomingincreasingly important. Much less research emphasishas been devoted to takeover activity within thegeneral area of financial services with thisparticularly the case for the building society sector. The...

A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a financial market in which asset prices are determined endogenously in terms of a short-run equilibrium. Investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules) depending on the exogenous states of the world and the observed history of the game....

We consider a stochastic model of a financial market with long-lived dividend-paying assets and endogenous asset prices. The model was initially developed and analyzed in the context of evolutionary finance, with the main focus on questions of “survival and extinction” of investment...

In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2...

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and...

I study intermediation in networked markets using a stochastic model of multilateral bargaining in which traders compete on different routes through the network. I characterize stationary equilibrium payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study efficiency...