Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated exclusively by extrinsic incentives. Social psychologists, in contrast, stress that intrinsic motivations are also important. In recent work, economic theorists have started to build psychological factors, like intrinsic...

Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated exclusively by extrinsic incentives. Social psychologists, in contrast, stress that intrinsic motivations are also important. In recent work, economic theorists have started to build psychological factors, like intrinsic...

Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated exclusively by extrinsic incentives. Social psychologists, in contrast, stress that intrinsic motivations are also important. In recent work, economic theorists have started to build psychological factors, like intrinsic...

We implement a randomized field experiment to study the impact of reminders on dental health prevention. Patients who are due for a check-up receive no reminder, a neutral reminder postcard, or reminders including additional information on the benefits of prevention. Our results document a...

We implement a field experiment to study the impact of reminder messages on dental health prevention. Patients who are due to schedule a check-up receive no reminder, a neutral reminder postcard, or reminders including additional information on the benefits of prevention. Our results document a...

This paper discusses voluntary contributions to health education in a shanty town in Peru, using a new experimental setup to identify voluntary contributions to local public goods. The experiment enables individuals to contribute to a health education meeting, which will only continue if the...

In mixed health care systems a crucial condition for the success of Managed Care (MC) plans is to win over a su±cient number of general practitioners (GPs) acting as gatekeepers. This contribution reports on GPs' willingness-to-accept (WTA) or compensation asked, respectively, for changing from...

We propose the bounds on ATE using intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator when there are compliers/noncompliers in randomized trials. The bounds are given as ITT<ATE<CACE, where compliers’ average treatment effect (CACE) can be computed from ITT and complier ratio. We show that these bounds can be derived from two assumptions: (1) average treatment effect is greater with compliers than noncompliers or CACE>NACE, (2) noncompliers' average treatment effect (NACE) is nonnegative. We give an example of poverty impacts of health insurance, and...</ate<cace,>

Health insurance is potentially subject to risk selection, i.e. adverse selection on the part of consumers and cream skimming on the part of insurers. Adverse selection models predict that competitive health insurers can eschew high-risk individuals by o¤ering contracts with low deductibles or...