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Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment
Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086286
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Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment
Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703707
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Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment
Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000
experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772130
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Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand
Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000
We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772248
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Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences?
Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649821
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Taking the initiative. What characterizes leaders?
Bruttel, Lisa; Fischbacher, Urs - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 147-168
Taking the initiative is a crucial element of leadership and an important asset for many jobs. We assess this element of leadership in a game in which it emerges spontaneously since people have a non-obvious possibility to take the initiative. We can show that leadership in this game correlates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729777
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Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision
Charness, Gary; Yang, Chun-Lei - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 102 (2014) C, pp. 119-132
We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public-goods game, where efficiency increases with group size (up to a limit, in one treatment). It is feasible to exclude group members, to exit one's group, or to form larger groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776752
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Other-regarding Preferences, Group Identity and Political Participation: An Experiment
Robalo, Pedro; Schram, Arthur; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We experimentally study the relationship between other-regarding preferences, group identity and political … participation. In doing so, we propose a novel group identity induction procedure that succeeds in creating environments where in … differences between environments where group identity is high and low. This suggests that the higher participation observed in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256817
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358972
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Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?
He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014
We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037