We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the...

We study IPO pricing in Germany to determine whether when-issued trading provides information that is useful for setting IPO offer prices, and whether such trading supplants bookbuilding as a source of information. We find that when-issued trading reveals relevant information for pricing IPOs,...

We explain and provide evidence for effects of leverage on pricing. Our model identifies two effects that either counteract or reinforce each other, depending on the debt maturity structure: (i) firms set higher prices (underinvest in market share) if they have more debt, and (ii) firms engage...

This paper examines the German IPO pricing process which combines bookbuilding with a liquid pre-IPO when-issued market. We find no partial adjustment phenomenon, as has been documented for U.S. IPOs. We thus find no evidence that bookbuilding provides information for IPO pricing, beyond the...

We develop a model that allows for the coexistence of bookbuilding and when-issued trading. We show that, due to interactions between these two processes, allowing for when-issued trading is for the most part beneficial for issuers. When-issued trading may interfere with information gathering...

We relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for...

The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are characterized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk averse and that each manager's (agent's) actions affect both that manager's expected return and the correlation of returns between...

We relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for...

This article shows how both technological and competitive risks affect the timing of private and initial public offerings in an emerging industry. Early private financing occurs in industries that are perceived to be risky, with high development costs and low probability of being displaced by...

We relate the organizational form of investment banking syndicates to moral hazard in team production. Although syndicates are dissolved upon deal completion, membership stability across deals represents a barrier to entry that enables the capture of quasi-rents. This improves incentives for...