We study discrete-type screening without Spence-Mirrlees condition. Under non-separable and non-concave cost, all packages can be distorted in equilibrium, even when only the participation constraints are active. This and other paradoxical effects, shown by examples, are caused by some kind of...

It is shown that supplementing any usage-based pricing with a flatt-fee scheme is profit improving when the savings from transactions costs and from deadweight loss by using flat fee exceed the additional production costs. We use a most general model, without many traditionally used assumptions...

The present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under incomplete information, the...

A number of products that display positive network effects are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include corporate operating systems, infrastructure software, web services and networking equipment. In many of these contexts, the magnitude of network effects are...

We develop a theory of exclusive dealing that rehabilitates pre-Chicago-school analyses. Our theory rests on two realistic assumptions: that firms are imperfectly informed about demand, and that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals. Under those assumptions, exclusive...

We solve for the optimal mechanism for selling two goods when the buyer’s demand characteristics are unobservable. In the case of substitutable goods, the seller has an incentive to offer lotteries over goods in order to charge the buyers with large differences in the valuations a higher price...

We extend the ‘no-haggling’ result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer’s valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations...