We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where government in each country use quotas or taxes as a strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play : targeting domestic emission, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with...

Recent empirics report that transport cost reductions signicantly contribute to rapidly growing world trade. This paper develops a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade with transboundary pollution from consumption to consider how market integration in the form of transport cost...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting with transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental outcomes, making both countries worse off. With command and control policies (quotas), there is no race to...

This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two...

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The...

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with...

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to...