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Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a … be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1 … intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260731
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Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376
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Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik O; Sheremeta, Roman M - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a … be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1 … intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817410
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Side-payments and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 278-286
-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666054
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Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict
Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112071
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Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549
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Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817424
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Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution
Kimbrough, Erik; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123534
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Commitment problems in conflict resolution
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 33-45
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263909
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Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining
Karagözoglu, Emin; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2010
coarse performance information lead to bargaining asymmetries. In addition, we find that bargainers’ subjective entitlements … subjective entitlements together with the differences in entitlements between better and worse performers influence the whole …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511615