In this document, we present the notion of a cost game, defined as a cooperative game where the gain from cooperation is the cost reduction obtained when the projects of a set of agents are realized in a coordinated way. The problem is then to decide how this gain will be shared among agents or...

In this paper, we present the main solution concepts for cooperative games, which have been used in the context of cost games. We put a special emphasis on the concept of core. We also present the concepts of semicore, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, nucleolus and Shapley value. However, we...

Large cities have underground networks of pipes and/or wires for water, sewage, natural gas, electricity and telecommunication services. These networks carry heavy fixed costs that must be shared among users. This problem has specific characteristics that we illustrate with an example. After...

In this paper, we present the different cost sharing methods one can find in the economic literature. We regroup the methods into three sets : the proportional methods, the cooperative game theory methods and the serial cost sharing methods. All those methods are presented through the stylized...

It is important that the choice of a cost sharing method be made on the basis of its general equity and consistency properties rather than on the basis of the results it may generate in a given application. In this paper, we partition the different methods according to whether they satisfy a...

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic...