Showing 1 - 10 of 451
We develop a nonparametric approach that allows for discrimination among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions. Three models of entry are considered: those of Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), and a new model in which the information received at the entry stage is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970943
The paper contains supplemental material for Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach."
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008471277
We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example that some allocation rules are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970936
This paper studies Bayesian equilibrium in a worker firm matching problem in which workers choose their human capi- tal investment and firms choose wages before the matching process occurs. Symmetric equilibrium exists, and supports assortative matching. However, when the number of traders is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970941
Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970942
The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970948
This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970949
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004975579
This paper provides a directed search model designed to explain the residual part of wage variation left over after the impact of education and other observable worker characteristics has been removed. Workers have private information about their characteristics at the time they apply for jobs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004975584
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004975585