We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983), who states ”when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income”. Instead of comparing different income distributions...

We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a redistribution of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner. We study the impact of redistribution on group contribution, on individuals’ contribu- tions according to...

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal–agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation...

Nous étudions expérimentalement les résultats d’un jeu de coordination à deux joueurs et deux actions par joueur répété sur 50 périodes. Ce jeu de coordination de type « chasse au cerf » possède deux équilibres de Nash en stratégie pure qui sont Pareto ordonnés : un...

En France, la fraude fiscale représenterait selon les estimations du syndicat national des impôts près de 45 milliards d'euros soit presque le montant des recettes de l'impôt sur le revenu. À l'échelle européenne, la fraude fiscale est estimée à au moins 2% du PIB des 25 pays membres,...

In this article we examine the setting up of an eductive type of reasoning process in a negative feedback situation. We analyse a variant of a one-shot beauty contest game. Our results show a reasoning level of around 2 steps of introspection, which is enough to reach rapidly the rational...

In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluter’s individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore, new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the...

We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players’ actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that chosen numbers are closer to the rational expectation equilibrium than in a strategic complements environment...