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Information corruption and optimal law enforcement

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257930

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less …We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708003

Social Interaction in Tax Evasion

Lipatov, Vilen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260229

Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules

Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2014

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764298

Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement

Garoupa, Nuno; Jellal, Mohamed - In: European Journal of Law and Economics 23 (2007) 1, pp. 59-69

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005705270

Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Garoupa, Nuno; Jellal, Mohamed - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our Paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124218

Uncertain Penalties and Compliance

Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos - Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, …

Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine … compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When … enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094306

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

Jellal, Mohamed; Garoupa, Nuno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113598

Publisher's announcements and piracy-monitoring devices in software adoption

Darmon, Éric; RUFINI, Alexandra; Torre, Dominique - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM) - 2014

In this paper, we investigate the distribution strategy of a software publisher. The user adoption context is characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good)and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969000

The Construction of Morals

Chen, Daniel L.; Yeh, Susan - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES), … - 2013

When do policies generate expressive or backlash effects? Recent economic models suggest that where a proscribed activity is prevalent, permissive laws liberalize attitudes toward partakers while increasing utility. The opposite occurs in communities where the proscribed activity is rare. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266041

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