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throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence. …We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a … positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117134
under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality …We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous … and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010900277
under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality …We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous … and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933839
’ (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local … information on the network structure. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090544
’ (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local … information on the network structure. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (1) the priors assign … unrealistic assumptions that the size of the network is common knowledge or that the types of players are independent are far from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091251
In many contexts, players interact only with a subset of the whole population, i.e., players interact on a network …. This paper a setting in which players are located on a network and play a fixed game with their neighbors. Players have … incomplete information on the network structure. They have a common prior over the network, and in addition, they know the number …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092084
strategic interactions when neighborhood structure, modeled in terms of an underlying network of connections, a¤ects payo¤s. We … provide results characterizing how the network structure, an individual.s position within the network, the nature of games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076082
Weinstein and Yildiz (Econometrica, 2007) have shown that only very weak predictions are robust to mispecifications of higher order beliefs. Whenever a type has multiple rationalizable actions, any of these actions is uniquely rationalizable for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019209
We show that when firms have asymmetric information about the market demand and theirs costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493981
We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992503