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, strategy-proofness, and unanimity, with and without anonymity, are decomposable on non-dictatorial single-peaked voting domains. …Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two …, strategy-proofness, unanimity, and feasibility together are not totally unimodular in collective choice environments in general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158608
We study the general problem of public choice. We consider environments where agents’ identities may not be observable. A “rule” associates a preference profile with an alternative. An agent may create fictitious identities and submit multiple preference relations under them. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041704
“interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049862
<Para ID="Par1">We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where … attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151960
We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are … if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892169
We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are … if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892192
We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and ?nite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057394
In this paper we propose to analyze the economic problem of allocating tasks on time in order to finish a complex project when information about tasks' duration and predating sequences of tasks is privately owned by the agents that undertake each task. In order to achieve the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121326
The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010562399
The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371334