Using a Verreccia [1983]-type model, we study the optimal voluntary disclosure strategy of a manager with private information that helps the market interpret financial information the firm is required to report. In equilibrium, the manager’s disclosure strategy enhances upward or mitigates...

We study the way in which SEC restrictions on fund manager compensation affect portfolio choice when investors buy into funds whose recent performance has been good. We find that fund managers choose riskier portfolios than they would if there were no contracting restrictions and that these...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information...

We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions,...

Managers have sufficient discretion under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to adopt more or less conservative financial reporting policies. In this paper, we develop a signaling model to provide insight into managers' decisions to be conservative in their accounting. We provide...

This paper examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on the competitive advantage of All-Star analysts. We find that Institutional Investor All-Americans, chosen by the votes of institutional investors based on overall helpfulness to the buy-side, experienced a significant...