We study the way in which SEC restrictions on fund manager compensation affect portfolio choice when investors buy into funds whose recent performance has been good. We find that fund managers choose riskier portfolios than they would if there were no contracting restrictions and that these...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information...

We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions,...

Using a Verreccia [1983]-type model, we study the optimal voluntary disclosure strategy of a manager with private information that helps the market interpret financial information the firm is required to report. In equilibrium, the manager’s disclosure strategy enhances upward or mitigates...