the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … determinedthat depends on the relative positions of the players within the graph.A collection of graphs will be called balanced if to … ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in …

lies in the core and the payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection of graphs. We … that depends on the relative positions of the players within the graph. A collection of graphs will be called balanced if … vector of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement of the core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration …, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In … possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions …

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …

to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration …, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In … possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions …