Several recent papers show that by introducing a slight departure from the standard assumption that payoffs of a game are common knowldege, it is possible that a unique equilibrium arises. In this survey paper, we try to understand the underlying mechansims of this literature. We focus on a main...

A lot of attention has been devoted to give epistemic foundations to usual equilibrium concepts in game theory. An equilibrium concept is said to have an epistemic foundation if one can identify conditions in terms of knowledge and rationality of the players which are sufficient to guarantee...

In a strategic game, a curb set (Basu and Weibull, Econ Lett 36:141–146, 1991) is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets (Voorneveld, Games Econ Behav 48:403–414, 2004) relax this condition by only requiring...

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity...

This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the global impact of a small probability event (i.e., its propensity to affect strategic behavior at all states in the state space) has an...

This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogeneous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information...