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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014
investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780761
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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014
paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186230
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014
paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2015
rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266604
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The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1913-1946
We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043015
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A Solution for General Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods when Indifferences Are Allowed
Subiza, Begoña; Peris, Josep - Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría … - 2013
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, although it may contain Pareto inecient allocations. The strict core solves this shortcoming when indiff erences are not allowed, but when agents' preferences are weak orders the strict core may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010991673
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2010
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933673
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(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2012
We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In “small” economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933680
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934645
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An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945031