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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that … an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415
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Social Background, Cooperative Behavior, and Norm Enforcement
Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - 2009
Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use of and the reaction to the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have recently been documented in cross-cultural studies. We present data that prove that stark...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541869
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The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments
Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one … punishment among individuals during Ramadan, even when the degree of their religiosity varied. However, less religious people did …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369116
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Social Background, Cooperative Behavior, and Norm Enforcement
Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan - 2009
Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechansism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517832
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Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement
Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 2, pp. 341-354
Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573033
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Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision
Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura K. - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 11, pp. 1036-1046
vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056154
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An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games
Ramalingam, Abhijit; Godoy, Sara; Morales, Antonio J.; … - School of Economics, University of East Anglia - 2014
In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose unilaterally whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103304
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Voluntary contributions with redistribution: The effect of costly sanctions when one person's punishment is another's reward
Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis; Garcia, Bruno - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013) C, pp. 34-48
contributions, punishments and earnings change when punishment is in the form of fines the punisher distributes to other members of … her group. The linked punishment-reward set up is of theoretical interest and could represent simultaneous shifts of … social disapproval and approval. Conjectures that punishment will be better targeted, and that it will be more substantial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719265
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State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655
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Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is … rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703051