For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always exist and form a lattice. However, the lattice operations were not simple and not distributive. Recently Alkan [3]...

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

"Ontological Planning" as a new concept, this paper will attempt to clarify an interpretation of the existential philosophy in urban dimension, the adaptability of this interpretation to physical planning and the main principles of ontological planning. These principles will be explained via...

The process of demographic change occurring around the world is also reflected in Turkey. The elderly population and thus, the number of people who are in need of care, will increase in Turkey in the future. Furthermore, approximately 13% of Turkey's population consists of disabled people. This...

If urban design decisions are taken ignoring the historical value of buildings, cultural inputs and meaning of the space based on memories and experiences, the sense of place disappears like in Konya Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi Square. Konya was the capital of Anatolian Seljuk, and the Mevlana...

We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers.

Given any problem involving assignment of indivisible objects and a sum of money among individuals, there is a fair assignment (namely the minmax money assignment) which can be extended monotonically to a new fair assignment for any object added or person removed, and another (the maxmin value...

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice...