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In the long-run we are all dead: On the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833242
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Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2011
A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917760
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Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 9-10, pp. 797-807
A normative conflict arises when multiple plausible rules exist, specifying how one ought to behave in a given situation. In such cases, enforcing one normative rule can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608540
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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with … punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions
Balafoutas, Loukas; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Nikiforakis, … - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 308-310
This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743720
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Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458710
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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822636
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Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051667
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Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient
Gaudeul, Alexia; Crosetto, Paolo; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
Should people be allowed to leave joint projects freely or should they be deterred from breaking off? This depends on why people stop collaborating and whether they have good reasons to do so. We explore the factors that lead to the breakdown of partnerships by studying a public good game with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122784
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Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas : Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation
Galbiati, R.; Vertova, P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005
Laws consist of two components: the 'obligations' they express and the 'incentives' designed to enforce them.In this paper we run a public good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas.The results show that, for given marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090423