This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the...

Does there exist a voting rule to be, for example, inserted into the constitution of a newly constructed apartment building, which is likely to attract the greatest number of consumers? We analyze this and other questions within a framework in which co-owners resolve future debates by voting. We...

This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical...

Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the...

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or...

Numerous studies have explored how the European Union's institutions shape political behavior and legislative outcomes in the EU. Far fewer examine in detail how individual institutional changes have come about. This paper presents a formal model that allows us to analyze under what conditions...

This paper's objectives are to design laboratory experiments of finite and infinite sequen- tial collective search models and to test some implications obtained in the model of Albrecht, Anderson and Vroman (2010) (the AAV model). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the average...

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...

This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate....