Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag entstand im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes über die monetäre Integration von fünf mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Beitrittskandidaten (Polen, Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Slowenien und Estland). Das hier vorgestellte Kapitel geht auf die...

Despite descriptive empirical evidence on start-up numbers and survival rates of young firms, the interaction of market entry decisions and reactions of incumbent competitors is still insufficiently understood in the entrepreneurship literature. Repeated games offer a suitable theoretical...

We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring...

We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to...

We study a bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedure with complete information and endogenous unrestricted agenda, in which offers can be made in any subset of outstanding issues. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this procedure to have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium agreement.

Rationalizability is a widely accepted solution concept in the study of strategic form game with complete information and is fully characterized in terms of assumptions on the rationality of the players and common certainty of rationality. Battigalli and Siniscalchi extend rationalizability and...

In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among valuations with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity...

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social...

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show...