Registrars' offices at most universities face the daunting task of allocating course seats to students. Because demand exceeds supply for many courses, course allocation needs to be done equitably and efficiently. Many schools use bidding systems in which student bids are used both to infer...

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some...

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it...

There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${\$}25$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> billion business annually. The present...</equationsource></inlineequation>

“Assignment messages” are messages that parameterize substitutable preferences using a particular linear program. An “assignment exchange” is a simplified Walrasian exchange in which participants are restricted to report only assignment messages. Any pure Nash or e-Nash equilibrium of...

In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect...

In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect...

If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...