If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using Bayesian learning, it is known that their strategies eventually approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated game under an absolute-continuity assumption on their prior beliefs.  We suppose here that Bayesian learners do not start with...

A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble play of exact equilibria, and not just play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated...

This paper is a brief history of game theory with its main theme being the nature of the decision makers assumed in the various stages of its historical development. It demonstrates that changes in the "image of man" nourished the developments of what many believe to be progress in game theory....

We investigate the problem of learning to play a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Each player attempts to improve her average score by adjusting the frequency of the three possible responses. For the zero-sum case the learning process displays Hamiltonian chaos. The learning trajectory can...

Recent developments in arms races and their theoretical analysis are treated, including the changing nature of arms races and their impacts on arms expenditure and international stability. The dominant East-West arms race of the Cold War has ended, but arms races still exist, and it is likely...

Consider a two-player discounted repeated game in which each player optimizes with respect to prior beliefs about his opponent's repeated game strategy. One would like to argue that if beliefs are cautious then players will learn as the game unfolds to predict the continuation path of play. If...