This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results...

In this paper, I seek to establish a framework in which solutions to imperfect recall decision problems can be suitably examined. I introduce a strategy concept which is an extension of the standard concept employed since von Neumann and Morgenstern, and show how it may provide optimal solutions...

This paper reconsiders the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007) and proposes an additional regularity condition concerning the playersʼ equilibrium strategies. The condition, which requires equilibrium strategies to induce the same local behaviour at all nodes with...

Politik hat vielfach zum Ziel, das Verhalten von Wirtschaftssubjekten durch eine Veränderung der Rahmenbedingungen zu steuern. Bei der Politikfolgenabschätzung müssen deshalb Voraussagen gemacht werden, wie Menschen sich an veränderte ökonomische Bedingungen anpassen. Eine wichtige...

Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. Because the unreviewed movies tend to be below average in quality, this practice provides a useful setting in which to test models of limited strategic thinking: Do moviegoers seem to realize that no review is a sign of...

Traditionally the emphasis in neural network research has been on improving their performance as a means of pattern recognition. Here we take an alternative approach and explore the remarkable similarity between the under-performance of neural networks trained to behave optimally in economic...

Bounded rationality and, more specifically, satisficing in game playing assumes choosing strategies by anticipating their likely consequences. Unlike orthodox game theory, one does not require optimality and rational expectations but views satisficing as a reasoning process with several possible...

In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their...