We study models of credit with limited commitment, which implies endogenous borrowing constraints. We show that there are multiple stationary equilibria, as well as nonstationary equilibria, including some that display deterministic cyclic and chaotic dynamics. There are also stochastic...

This paper studies models of credit with limited commitment and, therefore, endogenous debt limits. There are multiple stationary equilibria plus nonstationary equilibria in which credit conditions change simply because of beliefs. There can be equilibria in which debt limits display...

We study models of credit with limited commitment, which implies endogenous borrowing constraints. We show that there are multiple stationary equilibria, as well as nonstationary equilibria, including some that display deterministic cyclic and chaotic dynamics. There are also stochastic...

We study models of credit with limited commitment, which implies endogenous borrowing constraints. We show that there are multiple stationary equilibria, as well as nonstationary equilibria, including some that display deterministic cyclic and chaotic dynamics. There are also stochastic...

We study models of credit with limited commitment, which implies endogenous borrowing constraints. We show that there are multiple stationary equilibria, as well as nonstationary equilibria, including some that display deterministic cyclic and chaotic dynamics. There are also stochastic...

We develop a model where: (i) banks take deposits and make investments; (ii) their liabilities facilitate third-party transactions. Other models have (i) or (ii), not both, although we argue they are intimately connected: we show that they both emerge from limited commitment. We describe an...

We build a model in which verifiability of private debts and timing mismatch in debt settlements lead to liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that resembles repurchase agreements between the...

This paper provides a simple two-depositor, two-stage model to understand how a bank’s withdrawal history affects an individual’s decision about withdrawals, which could possibly trigger bank runs. Individual depositors have private information about their personal consumption types and...

We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open...

Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his liquidity type (patient or...