We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...

Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...

We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...

For different purposes, economists may use different topologies on types. We char- acterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both the strategic topology and the uniform...

The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show...

Barelli [P. Barelli, On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 144 (2009) 1320-1332] defines beliefs-determine-preferences (BDP) models and argues that BDP models are nongeneric in a topological sense. In this note, we point out some difficulties in...

value greater than the Stackelberg payoff.