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Uniform topologies on types
Xiong, Siyang; Chen, Yi-Chun; di Tillio, Alfredo; … - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631386
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Uniform Topologies on Types
Chen, Yi-Chun; Tillio, Alfredo Di; Faingold, Eduardo; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577753
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Topologies on types
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309
We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812752
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Topologies on Type
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006
We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens- Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance be- tween a pair of types as the di¤erence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766882
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The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs
Chen, Yi-Chun; Tillio, Alfredo Di; Faingold, Eduardo; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216
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Interim correlated rationalizability
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515732
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A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
Chen, Yi-Chun - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 587-597
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any … the normal-form concept of interim correlated rationalizability and we assume that players have no relevant knowledge of … rationalizability. We also strengthen the main selection result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by showing that the result holds for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
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Coordination of Expectations: The Eductive Stability Viewpoint
Desgranges, Gabriel - In: Annual Review of Economics 6 (2014) 1, pp. 273-298
The eductive approach consists of finding solutions consistent with common knowledge of individual rationality and the model. An equilibrium is stable whenever it is the unique outcome consistent with these assumptions. This is a strong stability criterion as it relies on no assumption of prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004692
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The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games
Brandenburger, Adam - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Knowledge <i>(Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel)</i></li> <li>Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria <i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010976
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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Aumann, Robert; Brandenburger, Adam - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206381