We enquiry about the effects of first and second order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of the consumers’ willingness to pay, within the standard model of a market with network externalities and hump-shaped demand curve. This issue is analyzed in the polar cases of perfect...

Karl Popper is one of the most important philosophers on contemporary science. His works related with both natural and social sciences are well known. This paper fries to provide some elements to answer the following question: is it sensible to apply Popper's methodology to economics? The topics...

We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed duopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way in which they are affected by the degree of product substitutability. This...

We study the optimal manipulation rules of a public firm’s objective function in a mixed oligopoly with imperfect product substitutability. We start with a baseline duopoly model and compare the solutions under quantity and price competition, and the way they are affected by product...

We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot competition and show that for dispersion equilibria to exist, (a) a necessary condition is that the distribution be not unimodal, and (b) a sufficient condition is that the distribution be convex with a unique antimode and that asymmetry is not...

We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot competition and show that a necessary condition for dispersion equilibria is that the distribution be not unimodal.

The first order approach to solving the standard one-dimensional principal-agent model is conditional upon the relevant stochastic production function obeying two noteworthy restrictions: that the Likelihood Ratio be monotonically increasing in output, and that the distribution function be...

In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a...