<title>Abstract</title> In a spatial economic context, we analyse the incentive to prey of an incumbent facing the potential entrance by a rival. We show that the existence of space modifies the incentive to prey of the incumbent and the resulting equilibrium.

This paper proposes a formal model that analyzes the degree of openness chosen by start-ups when entering the software industry. In line with the literature, we label as degree of openness the extent to which software start-ups mix open source (OS) and proprietary solutions in the portfolio of...

This article analyses the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a duopoly when one firm may choose whether to engage in behaviour-based price discrimination or uniform pricing while the rival price discriminates. The question we address is: should a firm price discriminate when facing a price...

We analyse the effects of predation in a vertical differentiation model, where the high-quality incumbent is able to price discriminate while the low-quality entrant sets a uniform price. The incumbent may act as a predator, that is, it may price below its marginal costs on a subset of consumers...

We analyse the effects of predation in a vertical differentiation model, where the highquality incumbent is able to price discriminate while the low-quality entrant sets a uniform price. The incumbent may act as a predator, that is, it may price below its marginal costs on a subset of consumers...

This paper examines the relationship between the degree of openness that software start-ups choose and some of the main industrial features faced by new entrants. Hypotheses derived from a formal model are tested through the implementation of econometric techniques and information provided by a...

We consider the strategic choice between product innovation and logistic optimization in a novel urban framework where consumers are distributed across the city and have different incomes depending on their location in the town. Depending on the relative efficiency of the product innovation...

We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of...