experiment tests whether the second movers update their beliefs after observing their paired first movers’ decision by eliciting … beliefs with different second mover knowledge of first mover decision, depending on treatment. We find that second movers do … update their beliefs conditional on receiving information on the first mover’s action, supporting Psychological Forward …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor …

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether …

players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this … their beliefs in order to take account of the reaction of their opponents to their own action. Second, we examine if players …

players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this … their beliefs in order to take account of the reaction of their opponents to their own action. Second, we examine if players …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, their beliefs appeared to be a better …

experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner. …

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations … (outgroup treatment). Dictators condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, the positive influence of … second-order beliefs on how much the dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment than in the outgroup treatment. From …

trust game experiment. In the experiments we inform donors about the beliefs of their respective recipients, while eliciting … identified a positive correlation between such second-order donor beliefs and generous behavior, as predicted by the guilt … three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information trust game experiment, and a hidden action …