We study the performance of Fictitious Play (FP), when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player game. We exhibit a class of two-player games having payoffs in the range <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$[0,1]$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> that show that FP fails to find a solution having an additive approximation...</equationsource></inlineequation>

The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the dimension d of the game. Using polytope...

This paper presents the “Game Theory Explorer” software tool to create and analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strategic form is created and nicely displayed with a graphical user interface in a web browser. State-of-the-art algorithms then compute all...