This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a...

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...

This paper considers a realistic family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable...

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...