This paper uses a bivariate probit model to analyze firms' decisions to impose regimes of exclusive dealing and/or exclusive territories with their distributors. We employ a panel data set of manufacturing firms (from 1990 to 2005) that contains information about such vertical restraints. Firms...

We explore how the incentives for exclusion, both in upstream and downstream vertical markets, are related to the bargaining position of suppliers and retailers. We consider a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers of imperfect substitutes offering...

This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and...

This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and...

While exclusive dealing can be efficient, the Chicago School has also argued that it cannot be anticompetitive, or that it seldom is. That argument takes two forms; both are weak. First, a pricetheory argument (“the Chicago Three-Party Argument”) depends crucially on a special model of...

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand...