Every n-person stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets for the players and bounded, upper semi-continuous payoffs has an -equilibrium for every >0.

This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find that if the game is connected, the limit feasible payoff set exists and is invariant to the initial prior about the state. Building on this invariance...

The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown in several contexts under a general condition called "coarser transition kernels". These results include various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with...

<Para ID="Par1">An autonomous correlation device in a multistage game is a device that, before every stage, chooses for each player a private signal, possibly in a correlated way, and reveals to each player the signal chosen for him. The chosen signals depend only on previous signals, and not on the actions of...</para>

We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and actions, and deterministic transitions, that possesses no measurable stationary equilibria, or even stationary approximate equilibria. The example is robust to perturbations of the...

We analyze an infinite horizon stochastic game with discounting of future single period payoffs that models interaction between Cournot duopolists producing differentiated products. There are two states of demand for an output of each firm. The probabilities of their occurrence depend on random...

We provide a direct, self-contained proof for the existence of the limit, as λ→0, of the values of a λ-discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an...

We consider the problem of the perturbation of a class of linear-quadratic differential games with piecewise deterministic dynamics, where the changes from one structure (for the dynamics) to another are governed by a finite-state Markov process. Player 1 controls the continuous dynamics,...