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Dynamic Contracts for Teams
Chung, Kim-Sau; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004
This paper studies repeated moral hazard in teams. Agents' actions are observable to each other but not to the principal. For any given dynamic contract, agents always select their favorite subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding dynamic game. The optimal dynamic contract must take that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090913
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Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation
Karni, Edi - In: Economic Theory 36 (2008) 3, pp. 337-351
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370740
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The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics
Otáhal, Tomáš - In: Politická ekonomie 2009 (2009) 5, pp. 677-695
the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545885
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Agency Revisited
Casadesus-Masanell, Casadesus-Masanell Ramón; Spulber, … - Fundación BBVA - 2007
The working paper presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating both moral hazard and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685255
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Combinatorial agency
Babaioff, Moshe; Feldman, Michal; Nisan, Noam; Winter, Eyal - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 999-1034
We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agentsʼ actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042925
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Review of Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet, When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
Marshall, John - In: International Journal of the Economics of Business 16 (2009) 1, pp. 139-146
inappropriate emphasis on the general theory of excessive risk-taking, which tends to deflect attention from the specific nature of …When Insurers Go Bust applies agency theory and the theories of adverse selection and moral hazard as the motivation …, and transparency. In consequence, ruin theory does not have an operational role. Theory is applied in familiar ways that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005268655
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Is Leverage Effective in Increasing Performance Under Managerial Moral Hazard?
Calcagno, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000
firm value.We study the effect of financing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091167
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Participation and Contract Choice in the Tenancy Market
Ahmed, Sharmina; Findlay, Christopher - Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI) - 2012
risk-sharing and moral hazard is far from settled. Moreover, existing empirical study very often plague by selection … observed contracts. Empirical tests reject the hypothesis of pure risk sharing and a wide range of support for the presence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860048
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The Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Basel III Requirements: A Justification For the Role of Audits? (Jurisdictional Analyses)
Ojo, Professor Marianne - In: Journal of Social Sciences (COES&RJ-JSS) 3 (2014) 4, pp. 530-541
between systemic risk and information asymmetries - hence the justification for greater focus on information channels as well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941012
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What is Wrong with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems in the Conventional Economic Theory
Lemennicier, Bertrand - International Centre for Economic Research (ICER) - 2014
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the conventional theory of moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard … and adverse selection problems in contemporary economic theory are plagued with four major aws: 1) the alleged … Rothschild and Stiglitz's theory and their followers based on additive or non additive expected utility associated with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941789