We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and...

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) benefits in developing countries reduces the e¤ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an...

[fre] Les départements français présentent de fortes disparités en matière de dépenses de santé . Le problème des autorités publiques est de déterminer si ces écarts représentent des différences en termes de besoins sanitaires et médicaux ou s ’ ils résultent d ’ une mauvaise...

La política de competencia y la expedición de la normatividad sobre la misma en Colombia han sido desarrolladas por los gobiernos atendiendo a las coyunturas políticas y económicas de cada momento. Igualmente, dicha evolución normativa se ha visto fuertemente influenciada por desarrollos...

Este trabajo revisa la literatura que trata del funcionamiento de la competencia en el sector de la salud cuando este está organizado alrededor de una managed care competition. Se abordan en una primera parte los problemas de asimetría de información que caracterizan los mercados de...

We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and...

In this paper, we analyze the joint regulation of health care providers and health insurance contracts in a framework which contains both induced demand effects from physicians and ex post moral hazard behaviors from patients. After defining a framework where these two kinds of behaviors can be...

Classical analysis of health insurance markets often focuses on adverse selection, which creates a direct externality between the enrollees of the same health plan: under an imperfect risk adjustment, the higher the risks of my co-enrollees, the higher my cost of insurance. This has lead to the...