: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of … the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two … of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory. …

: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …

of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is …We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a … lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several desirable poperties and is the …

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

. The new solution is a lexicographic value although it is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies core …<Para ID="Par1">We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games: The Surplus Distributor Prenucleolus …

only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus …We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the …

in the cooperative game theory. We show that the well-known solutions of the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value …, the nucleolus (or the prenucleolus), and the t -value, coincide under a mild condition onthe traveling cost. …