This paper studies the inefficiency of one-to-one matching markets as measured by the price of stability. We begin by providing some theoretical upper bounds on this type of inefficiency, bounds that vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to...

Psychological states side by side with the bounded rational expectations among social agents contributes to the pattern of consumptions in economic system. One of the psychological states are the envy – a tendency to emulate any gaps with other agents’ properties. The evolutionary game...

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of...

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we design a system for a shop, to negotiate both the contents and the price of bundles of goods...

Building upon recent work of Gintis, we study evolutionary dynamics in an economy with Leontieff preferences and corner endowments for which the equilibrium is completely indeterminate. We exhibit a class of dynamics which selects, via stochastic stability, the equilibrium minimizing the...

In the Grid Computing environment, many users need the results of their calculations within a specific period of time. Those users are willing to pay for getting their work completed on time. However, this requirement must be agreed on in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) by both, the user and the...

Using U.S. cross-sectional data, this paper calculates the welfare cost of a 10% inflation for different individuals and finds that the difference in cost between the poorest 10%, measured by their expenditure share on cash goods, and the richest 10% is in the order of 176%. That is, a poor...

Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent randomness. I adopt a matching framework similar to Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and assume that individuals belong to populations of different sizes. Despite the myopic behavior of...